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Abstract 
This paper investigates the government’s optimal 
subsidy and tax policies in response to consumer 
environmental awareness (CEA) and the 
manufacturers’ product selection (generic, green or 
both) plus quality and pricing decisions. We derive the 
equilibria under different policy combinations and 
derived the analytical and numerical solutions. We find 
that (1) subsidizing and taxing consumers is more 
social beneficial when the potential market share of 
green products is small and environmental technology 
is high; (2) subsidizing green-product consumers and 
taxing manufacturers who produce ordinary products 
can yield higher social welfare; (3) subsidizing and 
taxing manufacturers may be more social optimal 
when either CEA or consumer awareness of traditional 
quality is high. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Subsidy and tax policies are important instruments 
adopted by governments to stimulate green technology 
development. For example, the U.S. government 
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009, which granted a tax credit to 
consumers who purchased electric vehicles [8]. Feed-
In-Tariff is a policy instrument to attract investments in 
renewable energy by offering long-term guaranteed 
purchase agreements to green power producers to sell 
their electricity into the grid [2, 12, 15]. Gasoline taxes 
and carbon tax are added in the fuel price considering 
that greenhouse gas emissions from human activities in 
particular carbon dioxide (CO2) are responsible for the 
current observed global warming [1]. 
However, no policy is completely efficient. 
Diamond & David (2009) concluded that there is a 
strong relationship between gasoline price and hybrid 
adoption, but a much weaker relationship between 
incentive policies and hybrid adoption. Gallagher & 
Muehlegger (2011) showed that conditional on value, 
sales tax waivers are associated with more than a ten-
fold increase in hybrid sales relative to income tax 
credits. Lobel & Perakis (2011) examined that the 
current policies in Germany for the adoption of solar 
photovoltaic technology are not efficient. Therefore, in 
this paper, we focus on comparing the efficiency 
government policies (tax and subsidy) in stimulating 
the demand and supply of green products, and discuss 
the optimal polices with different environmental level 
product.  
Consumer environmental awareness (CEA) is 
another important factor affect green product demand. 
The rise of consumer environmental awareness (CEA) 
has changed consumer behavior. The BBMG 
Conscious Consumer Report shows that 67% of 
Americans agree that it is important to buy products 
with environmental benefits and 51% are willing to 
pay more for products with high environmental quality 
[3]. Considering the impact of CEA, researchers started 
to introduce environmental quality as a demand 
enhancement factor in the product demand function 
[14]. 
 In response to the government’s policy and rising 
CEA, manufacturers adapt their strategies by adjusting 
product prices and green product quality [7,20]. For 
example, in 2012, Honda Fit EV model was quickly 
sold out in Southern California after offering sizable 
leasing discounts [11]. Feed-In-Tariffs attracts a wide 
range of manufacturers to invest in renewable energy 
(such as PV) [2]. Manufacturer will introduce green 
product based on the ordinary product line with stricter 
environmental emission standard, given the green 
product subsidy or ordinary tax set out by the 
government [7, 18, 20]. The manufacturer decides how 
to set green product’s environmental quality and price 
with policy instruments and CEA are need to solve for 
the manufacturers.  
In this paper, we assume the manufacturer can 
choose to produce the variety of products: ordinary 
product or green product, consumers with different 
CEA will determine which product to purchase; 
government will provide subsidy or tax in order to 
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improve social welfare. We mainly investigate the 
following questions: 
1. How instruments policies affect social welfare 
with manufacturer’s product strategy and CEA? 
2. How environmental quality and price of green 
product change with CEA and instruments policies? 
3. What are the optimal policies with different 
CEA and environmental level of green product? 
 
We incorporate CEA and the quality of the green 
product into the demand function. This study compares 
two scenarios: (i) subsidy to green consumer and tax to 
ordinary consumer, (ii) subsidy to manufacturer who 
produces green product and tax to manufacturer who 
produces ordinary product. We derive the closed-form 
expressions of price with quality. Then we present the 
changes of optimal subsidy and tax by using numerical 
examples and further give the zone division with 
different CEA.  
Our paper differs from the literature in the 
following ways:  (1) we compare the effectiveness of 
the government’s subsidizing and tax policies 
regarding green products when the policies instrument 
to different objects while previous studies only focused 
on one particular object [7,17,1]; (2) we incorporate 
environmental quality and CEA into demand function 
to observe the change of manufacturer’s strategy 
change, while other demand models assume that green 
demand is fixed [7,18,20,12]; (3) we present the 
optimal policies with different CEA and green 
products, while other literature with fixed green 
product and CEA [2,6,9,10].  
There are four main findings: (1) subsidizing and 
taxing to consumer is more beneficial when the 
potential market share of green products is small and 
environmental technology is high; (2) whenever 
government implements policy to consumer or 
manufacturer, the social welfare in concave with 
government subsidy and tax; (3) subsidy to green 
consumer and taxing to manufacturer who produces 
ordinary product could obtain high social welfare and 
environment quality; (4) government should subsidize 
manufacturer when green product has the low marginal 
profit; then, government should transfer from subsiding 
the manufacturer to consumers when the price of green 
product increases.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents the model description. Section 3 and 4 present 
manufacturer’s product strategy when the government 
implements policy to consumer and manufacturer, 
respectively. Section 5 describes numerical examples. 
Section 7 summarizes our main findings and concludes 
the paper by providing some directions for future 
research. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A. 
 
2. Model  
 
We start by explaining the different components of the 
environmental products, consumer utility, and social 
welfare. 
 
2.1. Products  
 
 We assume that a monopolist offers a specific 
class of durable products with two competing 
attributes, the traditional and environmental attributes, 
over which individuals may express quantifiable 
preferences. Given the assumption that both attributes 
behave like “qualities” (i.e., consumers who value each 
attribute prefer higher levels to lower levels on the 
attribute), we will from now on call them traditional 
and environmental qualities (denoted by tq and eq ). 
For example, tq and eq can represent the levels of 
safety rating and fuel economy of a vehicle, which 
usually conflict with each other [7,18]. Additionally, 
tq and eq can represent the specified levels of any 
competing traditional and environmental qualities, 
such as the material consistency and recycled content 
of a durable product. In order to capture the 
relationship between traditional and environmental 
qualities, we assume 1, 1t eq rq r   , because the 
technology of environmental quality improvement is 
costly, so the one unit improvement of environmental 
quality is always accompany with more units of 
traditional quality decrease, which is different from [7].  
The monopolist intends to supply all the customers 
in the market with either an ordinary product or 
multiple product type(s). The cost of supplying a 
product increases as a quadratic function with respect 
to the levels of its two qualities. That is, the unit cost of 
a product with qualities tq and eq is
2 2
t t e ec q c q , 
where ct and ce are positive cost coefficients. Assume 
that there is a fixed cost F associated with introducing 
any product type (for R&D and other relevant 
expenses). Assume further that there are no economies 
of scale so that unit cost is independent of the number 
of units produced.  
 
2.2. Demand 
 
We assume that demand of each product is 
impacted by its price and quality. When manufacturer 
provides two substitutable products, one product’s 
demand is also affected by another product’s price and 
quality. With the considerations of price competition 
and the demand enhancement due to ecofriendly 
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improvement, we give demand functions for green 
product and ordinary product, denoted by 
g g o o
g g g g g o gt t ge e gt t ge eD a b p p k q k q l q l q        
ot
o o g g
o o o o o g t oe e ot t oe eD a b p p k q k q l q l q        
where ia is initial market potential of product i, i=o or 
g, where represent ordinary product or green product, 
respectively; ib is product i’s demand sensitivity to 
price of product i, i is product i’s demand sensitivity 
to price of product j(j=o or g and j i ), 
,gt gek k represent green consumer’s sensitivity to the 
traditional quality and environmental quality of 
environmental product, ,ot oek k represent ordinary 
consumer’s sensitivity to the traditional quality and 
environmental quality of ordinary product, ,gt gel l  are 
green consumers’ sensitivity to the traditional quality 
and environmental quality of  ordinary product 
and ,ot oel l  are ordinary consumers’ sensitivity to the 
traditional quality and environmental quality of green 
product, respectively. Notice that i ib  , 
it itk l and ie iek l , because product i’s price and 
quality has more influence than his competitor’s price 
and quality. We assume that 
0i i i i ja b p p   and 0iD  . 
Our demand model is a linear stochastic model 
with substitution: (i) the expected demand of a product 
decreases with its price; however how the 
improvement of environmental quality impacts demand 
depends on consumers’ emphasis on environmental 
quality and traditional quality; (ii) the price of one 
product increases the mean demand of the other 
product; however, whether the environmental quality 
of one product increases or decreases the mean demand 
of the other product still depends consumers’ 
preference. Our demand model is inspired by [5,15]. 
We assume that there is no repeat purchase, i.e., 
customers will leave the market forever after they have 
bought a unit of the product, regardless of the product 
type. 
 
2.3. Government policy  
 
We use 0t   and 0s   to denote the tax rate and 
the subsidy rate, respectively. The government aims at 
maximizing the weighted aggregate social welfare 
1 2 3 4D(E) ( )t eW U tQ sQ          (1) 
Similar to [19], the government's objective (1) can 
be decomposed into industry welfare, consumer 
welfare, environmental welfare caused by 
environmental improvement, and the government 
income. The third item is sometime included in the 
second item, for example [4], however, we separate it 
in order to observe the effect of the environment 
change obviously. The value of the weight reflects the 
government emphasis on one party. For example, 
1 2 3 42 / 5, 1/ 5,       then we refer to a 
government as industry-friendly. The borderline case 
1/ 4, 1, 2,3,4n n   constitutes the benchmark. In 
this case, we label the government as neutral. 
 
2.4. Timing  
 
Decisions take place in four stages.  
Stage I, the government chooses the object of 
subsidy and tax policy: consumer or manufacturer. 
Stage II, the government decides the tax rate t or 
subsidy rate s. 
Stage III, the monopolist manufacturer decides to 
produce traditional product or environmental product, 
and determine the product environmental quality and 
price.  
Stage IV, consumer decides to purchase the 
traditional product or green product. 
 
3. Subsidy and tax to consumer   
 
In this subsection, government subsidize to 
consumer who purchase environmental product and tax 
to consumer who purchase ordinary product. 
Manufacturer could choose to produce one product-
environmental product or traditional product, two 
products-environmental product and traditional 
product.  
We assume that price of traditional product is fixed 
because of full market competition, then manufacturer 
focuses on determine price and quality of 
environmental product given government policy. 
In this section, consumer who purchases green 
product will obtain subsidy s, the subsidy may be price 
subsidy or other discount policy (e.g. the Electric 
Vehicle could obtain free license in Shanghai, China), 
hence subsiding to consumer increases total demand. 
Consumers who purchases ordinary product will be 
taxed t; when the manufacturer produces two products, 
there is product substitution; therefore, the demand 
functions with subsidy and tax are as follows:  
( ) ( ) g g o og g g g g o gt t ge e gt t ge eD a b p s p t k q k q l q l q        
ot( ) ( )
o o g g
o o o o o g t oe e ot t oe eD a b p t p s k q k q l q l q        
Manufacturer may produce traditional product, green 
product or both of them. We will present three 
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scenarios, then give manufacturer’s optimal strategy 
with government policy. 
 
3.1. One product-ordinary product 
 
In this scenario, manufacturer only produces 
ordinary product, then demand function of ordinary 
product is  
o ( )
o o
o o o ot t oe eD a b p t k q k q     , 
Then we can give manufacturer’s profit as follows, 
2 2
1 [ ( ) ]( )
o o o o o
o o o ot t oe e o t t e ea b p t k q k q p c q c q F        
s.t. 1o ot eq rq  . 
The manufacturer’s profit decreases with tax. 
 
3.2.  One product-green product 
 
In this scenario, manufacturer only produces green 
product, then demand function of green product with 
government subsidy is  
( ) g gg g g g gt t ge eD a b p s k q k q     , 
manufacturer’s profit function is as follows  
2 2
1 ( , ) [ ( ) ]( )
g g g g g g
e g g g g gt t ge e g t t e eq p a b p s k q k q p c q c q F        
s.t. 1g gt eq rq  . 
Proposition 1. If 2 0gt ge g tk r k rb c   and 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( ) / 2 3 /
3 / 0
e gt g e t g t e t ge ge gt g e ge
g e g t g e
c k a c c r b c c rc k k k r b c k r
b c r b c r s b c s
      
   
,  
then manufacturer’s profit function 1 ( , )
g g
e gq p  is 
joint concave with ,ge gq p . 
Theorem 1. When government chooses to subsidize 
environmental consumer and tax to traditional 
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is 
2 2
* ( )
2
g g g
g g ge ge gt t g t t e e
g
g
a b s k q k q b c q c q
p
b
    
, the optimal environmental quality *1
g
eq  is determined 
by *1 ( , ) 0
g g
e g
g
e
d q p
dq
  . 
 
3.3. Two products-ordinary product and green 
product 
 
In this scenario, manufacturer produces both green 
product and ordinary product, with government 
subsidy and tax to consumers, the manufacturer’s 
profit function with two products is given as follow, 
2 2
2
2 2
( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ]( )
[ ( ) ( ) ]( ) 2
g g g o o g g
e g g g g g o gt t ge e gt t ge e g t t e e
o o g g o o
o o o o g ot t oe e ot t oe e o t t e e
q p a b p s p t k q k q l q l q p c q c q
a b p t p s k q k q l q l q p c q c q F
 

          
           
s.t. 1g gt eq rq  . 
Proposition 2. If 2 0gt ge g tk r k rb c   and 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) / 2 3 / 3 /
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
o o
e gt g e t o e e g t e g e t ge e ge e
o
e gt t e o t o o g ge gt g e ge g e
o o o o
t t o e o t ge e gt t e t o e g t e
c k a c c r c q b c c r s b c s rc k c l q
c l q c p c p r k k r b c k r b c r
c q r c c r l q l q c c q r t c r c

 
   
       
       
       
 
, then manufacturer’s profit function 2 ( , )
g
e gq p  
is joint concave with ,ge gq p . 
Theorem 2. When government chooses to subsidize 
environmental consumer and tax to traditional 
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is 
2 2 2 2
* ( + ) ( ) ( )
2
g o o o o g g
g g o g ge ge gt t ge e gt t o o t t e e g t t e e
g
g
a p t b s k q k q l q l q p c q c q b c q c q
p
b
           
the optimal environmental quality *2
g
eq is determined 
by 
*
2 ( , ) 0
g
e g
g
e
d q p
dq
  . 
Remark 1. The price difference between no 
government policy and with subsidy and tax is  
2 2
g
g
tsp
b
   , 
if *geq keeps a constant. 
Both subsidizing to environmental consumer and 
taxing to traditional consumer increase price of green 
product, and the demand of green product increases 
(
2 2
g g
g
sb t
D
   ), the demand of ordinary product 
decreases (
2 2
g o o
o o
g
t sD b t
b
       ). 
The manufacturer will choose the optimal product 
strategy by comparing profits of above three scenarios. 
Substituting firm’s product strategy including product 
variety, product quality and price, then the social 
welfare is as follows: 
max max *
1 2
3 4
( , ) [( ) / 2 ( ) / 2]
( ) ( )
o o o g g g
g t
g e o e o g
W s t p p D p p D
D q D q tD sD
  
  
    
   
, 
government as the Stackelberg leader will determine 
the optimal subsidy and tax to maximize social 
welfare. We give the solution algorithm to seek the 
optimal subsidy and tax because of the complexity of 
analytic solutions. 
 
Algorithm 1. 
Step 1: 
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For s=0:0.2:smax 
for t=0:0.2:tmax 
solve 
* *
1 2( , ) ( , )0, 0,
g g
e g e g
g g
e e
d q p d q p
dq dq
   obtain 
*
1
g
eq , 1gp  and
*
2
g
eq , 2gp ; 
compute 1
o , * *1 1 1( , )g ge gq p , * *2 2 2( , )ge gq p , and 
social welfare 1 1 2, ,
o gW W W ; 
end 
end 
 
Step 2: 
Return the maximum of 1 1 2, ,
o gW W W , 
corresponding
* *
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ), ( , , , ), ( , , , )
o o g g g g
e g e gs t q p s t q p s t ;  
and manufacturer’s profit 
1 1 1( , )
o o os t , *1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) g g g ge gq p s t ,
*
2 2 2 2 2( , , , )
g
e gq p s t ; 
 
Step 3: 
Compare and get the maximum profit   
* * * *( , , , )ge gq p s t =max{ 1 1 1( , )o o os t ,
*
1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) 
g g g g
e gq p s t , *2 2 2 2 2( , , , )ge gq p s t }, 
 then the optimal environmental quality, price, subsidy 
and tax is * * *, , ,ge gq p s t , and the welfare is 
* * * * * *( , , ( , , , ))ge gW s t q p s t .  
 
4. Subsidy and tax to manufacturer 
 
In this section, government subsidize to 
manufacturer who sells one unit environmental product 
and tax to manufacturer who sells one unit traditional 
product. Similar to Section 3, manufacturer could 
choose to produce one product-environmental product 
or traditional product, two products-environmental 
product and traditional product.  
The demand function will not alter directly because 
the government tax and subsidize directly to 
manufacturer, however, manufacturer will change 
products’ price with government policy, hence, 
government policy changes demand function 
indirectly. Considering manufacturer’s three choices, 
we will discuss each scenario in following subsections. 
 
4.1. One product—ordinary product 
 
In this subsection, manufacturer only produces 
ordinary product, the marginal profit of one unit 
ordinary product with government tax is, 
 2 2o oo t t e ep c q c q t   , 
hence manufacturer’s profit is as follows,  
' 2 2
1 ( )( )
o o o o o
o o o ot t oe e o t t e ea b p k q k q p c q c q t F          
s.t. 1o ot eq rq  . 
Because of the full competition, we assume that 
price and quality of ordinary product are given, then 
manufacturer’s profit decreases with tax. 
 
4.2. One product—green product 
 
In this scenario, manufacturer only produces green 
product, then the profit of one unit green product with 
government subsidy is, 
2 2g g
g t t e ep c q c q s   , 
The manufacturer’s profit function is as follows,  
' 2 2
1 ( , , ) ( )( )
g g g g g g g
e t g g g g gt t ge e g t t e eq q p a b p k q k q p c q c q s F        
s.t. 1o ot eq rq  . 
Proposition 3. If 2 0gt ge g tk r k rb c   and 
2 2
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( ) / 2 3 /
3 / 0
e gt g e t g t e t ge ge gt g e ge
g e g t g e
c k a c c r b c c rc k k k r b c k r
b c r b c r s b c s
      
   
, then manufacturer’s profit function '1 ( , )
g g
e gq p  is 
joint concave with ,ge gq p . 
Theorem 3. When government chooses to 
subsidize environmental consumer and tax to 
traditional consumer, then green product’s optimal 
price is 
2 2
'*
1
( )
2
g g g g
g ge e gt t g t t e e
g
g
a k q k q b c q c q s
p
b
     , 
the optimal environmental quality *1
g
eq is determined 
by 
' *
1 ( , ) 0
g g
e g
g
e
d q p
dq
  . 
 
4.3. Two products-ordinary product and green 
product 
 
In this scenario, manufacturer produces both green 
product and ordinary product, with government 
subsidy to green product and tax to ordinary product, 
we can present manufacturer’s profit function with two 
products is given as follow, 
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' 2 2
2
2 2
( , , ) [ ]( )
[ ]( ) 2
g g g g o o g g
e t e g g g g o gt t ge e gt t ge e g t t e e
g g o o o o
o o o o g ot t oe e ot t oe e o t t e e
q q p a b p p k q k q l q l q p c q c q s
a b p p k q k q l q l q p c q c q t F
 

         
          
s.t. 1t eq rq  . 
Proposition 4. If 2 0gt ge g tk r k rb c   and 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 ( )
( )( ) ( ) / 2 3 / 3 /
( ) ( ) 0
o o
e gt g e t o e e g t e t ge e ge e
o
e gt t e o t o o g ge gt g e ge g e
o o o o
t t o e o t ge e gt t e t o e g t g e e o t o
c k a c c r c q b c c rc k c l q
c l q c p c p r k k r b c k r b c r
c q r c c r l q l q c c q r b c r s b c s tc c r t

 
    
     
       
         
 
, then manufacturer’s profit function '2 ( , )
g
e gq p  is 
joint concave with ,ge gq p . 
Theorem 4. When government chooses to subsidize 
environmental consumer and tax to traditional 
consumer, then green product’s optimal price is  
2 2 2 2
'*
2
( t) ( )
2
g o o o o g g
g g o ge ge gt t ge e gt t o o t t e e g t t e e
g
g
a p k q k q l q l q p c q c q b c q c q s
p
b
            
, the environmental quality ' *2
g
eq is determined by 
' *
2 ( , ) 0
g
e g
g
e
d q p
dq
  . 
Remark 2. The price difference between no 
government policy and with subsidy and tax is  
2 2
o
g
tsp
b
    , 
if ' *2
g
eq keeps constant.  
Subsidizing to manufacturer who produces green 
product reduces price of green product, and taxing to 
manufacturer who produces ordinary product also 
enforces manufacturer decreases price of green 
product. Therefore, both subsidy and tax have positive 
effect on increasing sales of green product.  
Similar to Section 3, the manufacturer will choose 
the optimal product strategy by comparing profits of 
above three scenarios. Then the government gives the 
optimal subsidy and tax according to the welfare 
function. We omit the solution algorithm to seek the 
optimal subsidy and tax similar to Algorithm 1. 
Because the complexity of the analytical solutions, 
we will give some numerical examples to illustrate the 
results obtained in Section 3 and 4. 
 
5. Numerical Examples 
  
In this section, we will verify the results obtained in 
Section 3 and 4, compare the two policies more 
intuitive.  
 
5.1. Optimal government policy 
 
In this subsection, we will present the optimal 
subsidy and tax policies, product quality and price of 
green product (if manufacturer determines to produce 
green product), and present the change of the optimal 
solutions with ga . 
The parameters are set as follows:
 60, 2, 2, 20, 20, 5, 50,o g o o e ta b b r p c c F       
0, 1, 0.2, 1, 1, 2, 0, 0.2,o oe t g o ge gt ot oe gt otq q k k k k l l          
max max 1 2 3 4
10.1, 10, 10 = = = = =100
4ge oe
l l s t         ， ， .    
From Table 1, we can see that when the number of 
the potential green consumer is much smaller, 
subsidizing and taxing to consumer is the optimal 
government policy; as the number of the potential 
green consumer increases, government should change 
from subsidizing to consumer to subsidize and tax to 
manufacturer.   
In both scenarios, the price, firm’s profit and social 
welfare increases with ga , however, the environmental 
quality keeps a constant with ga .  
When the government determines to subsidize 
green consumers, the optimal subsidy should decreases 
with ga , and there should no tax to ordinary consumer 
when the number of green consumer excesses a 
threshold point. 
When the government implements policies to 
manufacturer, the optimal subsidy and tax achieve its 
upper limits with ga . When ga is much smaller, the 
manufacturer will only produce ordinary product. The 
firm begins to produce when ga is large enough, and 
the optimal policies is to subsidy and tax to 
manufacturer.  
Therefore, when the number of the green consumer 
is small, it is much better to subsidizing and tax to 
consumer; when the number of the green consumer is 
very large, subsidy and tax to manufacturer is the best 
choice. 
Table 1. Optimal policies with ga  
 
I Subsidize and tax to consumer Optimal 
 policy 
ga  geq  p Profit/ product 
variety* 
(s,t) welfare  
10 0.24 9.1 135 (8.4,5.6) 172 I 
20 0.24 12.1 397 (8,0) 148 I 
30 0.24 14 485 (7,0) 190 II 
40 0.24 16 590 (6,0) 240 II 
50  0.24 18 709 (5,0) 299 II 
60 0.24 20 845 (4,0) 365 II 
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Note*: ‘o’ represents manufacturer only produce 
ordinary, ‘g’ represents green product, if there is no ‘o’ 
and ‘g’, it represents manufacturers produces two 
products.  
 
5.2. Social welfare change with subsidy and tax 
 
In this subsection, we present the change of social 
welfare with subsidy and tax to consumer. When the 
social planner applies these policies to manufacturer, 
the changes of welfare are similar to above results, so 
we omit them. The parameters are set as follows: 
30, 20, 1, 2, 15, 20,o g g o o ea a b b r p c      
10, 20, 0, 1, 0.2,o ot e t g oc F q q       
o= 1, 2, 0.2,ge e gt ot gt otk k k k l l      
1 2 3 4
1 20.1 = = = = =100.
5 5ge oe
l l       ， ， ，   
Figure1 shows that the social welfare is joint 
concave with s and t. It compares the social welfare 
change with different three policies: a). with subsidy 
and tax; b). with only subsidy; c). with only tax. It 
shows that the social welfare will not obtain maximum 
when social planner only uses subsidy, similarly, the 
social welfare will not obtain maximum when social 
planner only employs tax. 
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       Figure 1. Welfare as a function of t and s 
 
5.3. Comparison between policy to 
consumers and manufacturer 
 
In this subsection, we compare the price, profit, 
social welfare and environment quality between 
subsidy/tax to consumer and manufacturer. Let 
30, 20, 1, 2, 15, 20, 10, 20,o g g o o e ta a b b r p c c F        
o0, 1, 0.2, = 1, 2, 0.2,
o o
e t g o ge e gt ot gt otq q k k k k l l         
1 2 3 4
1 20.1, = = = , = , =100.
5 5ge oe
l l      
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Figure 2.  Price as a function of s 
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            Figure 4. Welfare as a function of s 
II Subsidize and tax to manufacturer Optimal 
 policy 
ga  geq  p Profit/ product 
variety 
(s,t) welfare  
10 - - 280/o 0 100 I 
20 - - 280/o 0 100 I 
30 0.24 5.24 367 (10,10) 298 II 
40 0.24 7.74 371 (10,10) 507 II 
50  0.24 10.14 624 (10,10) 456 II 
60 0.24 12.64 812 (10,10) 548 II 
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Let t = 0, Figures 2-4 compare the price of green 
product, profit, and social welfare between government 
subsidy to consumer and subsidy to manufacturer when 
manufacturer provides two products. We can see that 
the profit and welfare are bigger when government 
subsidizes to consumer.  
Let s = 0, Figures 5-7 show the changes of price of 
green product, profit, welfare and environmental 
quality with t when manufacturer provides two 
products, each figure gives two policy: tax to consumer 
and tax to manufacturer. We can see that taxing to 
traditional consumer has no effect on price of green 
product, however, taxing to manufacturer decreases 
green product’s price. Taxing policy decreases 
manufacturer’s profit and increases social welfare. 
Therefore, when the government intends to implement 
tax to improve environment quality and social welfare, 
taxing to manufacturer may be more beneficial. 
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Figure 6. Profit as a function of t 
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Figure 7. Welfare as a function of t 
 
5.4. Optimal policy with division zone 
 
In this subsection, we show how the optimal policy 
changes with the parameters. First, we apply numerical 
to the analytical results derived in Section 4, and then 
present the optimal policy with potential demand of 
green product and ordinary product, and then we 
explore the effect of CEA and consumer awareness on 
traditional quality on government policy. The 
parameters are set as follows: 
2, 2, 20, 20, 5, 50, 0, 1,o og o o e t e tb b r p c c F q q        
o0.2, =1, 0, 1, 2, 0.2,g o ge e gt ot gt otk k k k l l       
1 2 3 4
2 10.1, = , = = , =100.
5 5ge oe
l l         
When the number of the potential number of green 
consumer and ordinary consumer is small, subsidy but 
no tax is the best choice; when the number of potential 
green consumer and ordinary consumer excess some 
threshold points ( * '* * '*, , ,g g o oa a a a ) and 
*
ga >
*
oa ,
'*
ga >
'*
oa , the optimal policies changes. There 
is an obvious difference between two figures, that is, 
when the number of the potential green consumer is 
very large, there still exists subsidy when the 
government determines to implement policy to 
manufacturer, while there is no subsidy. 
 
Assume that the manufacturer produces two 
products with the considerable marginal profit, and this 
scenario is the most common for the vehicle 
manufacturers. In this example, we discuss the optimal 
government policy with CEA gek  and the consumers’ 
emphasis on traditional quality gtk of green consumer. 
Parameters are set as follows: 
20, 60, 0.3, 1, 2, 15, 20,gg o e g o o ea a q b b r p c       
10, 50, 0, 1, 0.2, 2, 1,o ot e t g o ot oec F q q k k        
1 2 3 4
2 10.2, 0.1, = , = = , =100.
5 5gt ot ge oe
l l l l         
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Let , [0,5]ge gtk k  , we can give the optimal zone 
division according to gek and gtk . 
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Figure 8. Optimal policies with gek and gtk  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present two optimal government 
policies with different environmental quality and CEA, 
and compare the subsidy and tax policies to consumer 
and manufacturer, then give the optimal choice for 
government. There are main four meaningful 
management insights: firstly, subsidizing and taxing to 
consumer is more beneficial when the number of 
potential green consumers is small and environmental 
technology is high. As the number of the potential 
green consumer increases, government should change 
from subsidizing to consumer to subsidize and tax to 
manufacturer; secondly, whenever government 
implements policy to consumer or manufacturer, the 
social welfare is concave with government subsidy and 
tax, firm’s profit decreases with tax and increases with 
subsidy; thirdly, subsidizing to consumer, the social 
welfare and firm’s profit increases much larger 
compared with subsidy to manufacturer; however, the 
tax has almost opposite results with subsidy, taxing to 
manufacturer may obtain higher social welfare than 
taxing to consumer; fourthly, subsidy and tax to 
manufacturer may be more beneficial when either CEA 
or consumer awareness on traditional quality is very 
high. 
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